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ABSTRACT

Rhetoric as a discipline is still touched by the shadow of ancient Greece.
Rhetoric was defined famously by Aristotle as the “available means of persuasion,”
codified into five canons in classical Rome, and has since been a central part of
Western education to train speakers and writers to effectively move their audiences.
However, particularly beginning in the mid-20th Century, the discipline’s understanding
of rhetoric as a means of persuasion (or even manipulation) passed down from our
ancient roots began to shift to a sense of rhetoric as matters of ethics and a concern for
the other. It begs the question: As a discipline, how did we get to a point where ethical
concerns have increasingly entered the rhetorical conversation?
With a theoretical focus, this study traces and examines how rhetoric’s relation to
ethics has transformed over the past 60 years from our discipline’s Aristotelian/Platonic/
Socratic inheritance to the introduction of multiple new perspectives and voices. In
suggesting that the goal of rhetoric is more than persuasion—a major focus of the
Platonic and Aristotelian tradition dominant in the field of rhetoric and composition in the
early 20th Century—this study traces a “turn” within our discipline from “confrontational”
rhetoric to “invitational” rhetoric. It suggests that invitational rhetoric challenges a strict
definition of rhetoric as persuasion seeks instead to understand rather than convert,
support camaraderie and mutuality (if not unity) instead of reinforcing dominant power
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relationships, challenge the speaker as much as the audience, and privilege listening
and invitation over persuasion when appropriate. Rhetorical ethics is defined as the
ethical decisions made in the everyday interactions that constantly invite us to make
rhetorical choices that inevitably have consequences in the world. The study examines
kairos/sophistic rhetoric, identification, and responsibility to establish a potential
framework for rhetorical ethics, as well as listening and acknowledgement as methods
for enacting this model. The ambition is a rhetoric of ethics that attends to everyday
situations; accommodates different, often “silenced,” voices; and offers the possibility of
an ethical encounter with others.
The study offers several possible conclusions about the nature of rhetorical
ethics. Significant areas of continued study include issues of voice, agency, and
marginalization—even invitational rhetoric does not guarantee that quieter or
disadvantaged voices will be heard. In all, an(other) rhetoric is both a ripe topic for
continued disciplinary attention, as well as a necessary component of everyday
interactions with others that long to display love over hate, listening over silencing,
inclusion over exclusion, and acceptance over rejection.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Overview
Rhetoric as a discipline is still touched by the shadow of ancient Greece.
Rhetoric was defined famously by Aristotle as the “available means of persuasion,”
codified into five canons in classical Rome, and has since been a central part of
Western education to train speakers and writers to effectively move their audiences.
However, particularly beginning in the mid-20th Century, the discipline’s understanding
of rhetoric as a means of persuasion (or even manipulation) passed down from our
ancient roots began to shift to a sense of rhetoric as matters of ethics and a concern for
the other. It begs the question: As a discipline, how did we get to a point where ethical
concerns have increasingly entered the rhetorical conversation? This study will trace
and examine how rhetoric’s relation to ethics has transformed over the past 60 years
from our discipline’s Aristotelian/Platonic/Socratic inheritance to the introduction of
multiple new perspectives and voices. The ultimate ambition is to work toward a
(re)definition of rhetoric in light of ethics.

Methodology
This study will have a theoretical focus, beginning with a review of Plato/Socrates
and Aristotle’s conceptions of rhetoric and ethics. In suggesting that the goal of rhetoric
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is more than persuasion—a major focus of the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition
dominant in the field of rhetoric and composition in the early 20th Century—this study
traces a “turn” within our discipline from what might be called “confrontational” rhetoric
to “invitational” rhetoric. Confrontational rhetoric—more in line with rhetoric grounded in
traditional Western and/or European institutions and attitudes—seeks to persuade,
conquer, convert, and ultimately change others. Invitational rhetoric was originally
defined by feminist scholars Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin in 1995 as “an invitation to
understanding as a means to create a relationship rooted in equality, immanent value,
and self-determination” (5). For purposes of this study, I suggest that invitational rhetoric
challenges a strict definition of rhetoric as persuasion and works instead toward the
possibility of an ethical encounter with others. In the “ethical encounter,” invitational
rhetoric seeks to understand rather than convert, support camaraderie and mutuality (if
not unity) instead of reinforcing dominant power relationships, challenge the speaker as
much as the audience, and privilege listening and invitation over persuasion when
appropriate.
The turn from confrontational to invitational rhetoric reflects multiple shifts in
traditional studies of rhetoric, including a reconsideration of what constitutes “rhetoric,” a
reexamination of the role of the self in rhetorical encounters, and an increasing concern
for the both the “other” and historically disadvantaged voices. Beyond the question of
whether there is an ethical form of persuasion, this study is primarily concerned with
ethics in terms of ethical relations with and responsibility to others. I do not suggest that
agonistic rhetoric or persuasive tactics are always inappropriate to teach, nor are they
always an ineffective rhetorical response. Rather, I propose that the disciplinary focus
2

on confrontational rhetoric to the exclusion of invitational techniques threatens to leave
out those who do not personify the classical “great men” of Ancient Greece and does
not address the wider ethical concerns inherent in rhetoric. My ambition instead is a
different model of rhetoric—one of rhetorical ethics—that attends to everyday situations;
accommodates disadvantaged, often “silenced,” voices; and offers the possibility of an
ethical encounter with others. The discipline as a whole is enhanced by augmenting our
agonistic, persuasion-focused inheritance with new, more inclusive rhetorical methods
that focus on distinctly ethical concerns.
New/revived techniques of interest in contemporary scholarship include studies
of identification and division (Kenneth Burke, Krista Ratcliffe [via Burke]); responsibility
to others (Emmanuel Levinas, Dietrich Bonhoeffer); listening and acknowledgement
(Krista Ratcliffe, Lisbeth Lipari, Michael Hyde); rhetoric as love (Jim Corder); and
kairos/sophistic rhetoric (Susan Jarratt, Bruce McComiskey, Michael Carter, James
Kinneavy, etc.). Drawing primarily from these works and focusing on the five areas of 1)
kairos/sophistic rhetoric, 2) identification, 3) responsibility, 4) listening and
acknowledgement, and 5) rhetoric as love, this study will trace the evolving relationship
between rhetoric and ethics within the discipline, as well as influences from other
disciplines such as philosophy, feminism, and theology. I will examine the various
studies that have helped us work toward a rewriting of rhetoric’s “other,” adding to the
available research by focusing specifically on the relationship between rhetoric and
ethics from our discipline’s ancient influences to present day. The study will question
what constitutes ethics from a rhetorical perspective. It will seek to answer how
has/does the study of rhetoric inform an evolving definition of ethics from our
3

Aristotelian/Platonic/Socratic inheritance, particularly over the past 60 years. Likewise,
as our discipline’s focus has shifted more toward a concern for the other, it will question
what an ethical engagement with others looks like, and how has/does rhetorical theory
inform it.

Ethics and Rhetoric: First Things First
How is ethics connected to rhetoric? If rhetoric is conceived as a technē
only—e.g., a defense against the available means of persuasion or a model for effective
public speaking—then ethics might be reserved as a philosophical or theological
problem. However, to define rhetoric so narrowly denies the basic nature of human
interaction. Kenneth Burke famously defined human beings as symbol-using (symbolmaking, symbol-misusing) animals. Humans are unique from other animals in our
critical process—people can “interpret our interpretations” (Warnock 80). “Burke makes
clear that linguistic choices are ethical decisions that are motivated by and
consequential in the world. Choices, therefore, are not free; nevertheless, people must
act,” explains Tilly Warnock (80). Not only must people act, but others are unavoidably
affected by our actions. Ethics is tied to rhetoric because everything we do as one
human reaching out to another—from what we say, to how we say it, who we listen to,
who we allow to speak, and even what we choose not to say—is by its nature an ethical
decision.
Rhetoric is not only an activity and area of study for the privileged and powerful
hoping to gain influence over their audiences. Instead, as the writers studied here will
suggest, our everyday interactions with others hold the power to display love or hate,
4

listening or silence, inclusion or exclusion, and acknowledgement or rejection.
Rhetorical ethics attends to these everyday situations. For teachers in any discipline,
recognizing the ethical implications of everyday rhetorical decisions has significant
applications in the classroom (e.g., including the silent introvert, listening to “different”
perspectives and encouraging alternative viewpoints, redefining what constitutes an
“argument,” embracing non-traditional modes of instruction or language, and so on). For
people of any nation, profession, or walk of life, the implications for our everyday
encounters are just as great.
What marks an encounter as ethical? British economist Ernst Friederich
Schumacher, an early proponent of sustainable building design, put forth the motto of
“Cease to do evil; try to do good,” which later become a credo of the sustainable design
movement. Yes, “evil” and “good” are tricky terms in contemporary scholarship. Though
our postmodern sensibilities remind us of the complexity of “good” and “evil,” as Ronald
Arnett explains, “this does not reject, nor de-privilege, the importance of temporal
discernment of a given ‘good.’” Within the loss of one universal “good” lives “the
tapestry of multiple social ‘goods’” which we must determine for ourselves and commit
to (“A Conversation” 54). The point of Schumacher’s appeal to this particular social
good is: if we are to avoid environmental disaster, we must try to do good for the
environment and cease to do those things which are known to be detrimental to the
natural world and others around us. The American Institute of Architects defines
sustainable design as “a collaborative process that involves thinking ecologically—
studying systems, relationships, and interactions—in order to design in ways that
remove rather than contribute stress from systems.” In much the same way, an ethical
5

encounter in the context of this study can be defined as an encounter that does not
prioritize the needs or will of the self over the other, but rather involves a sense of
“thinking ecologically” about our interactions with and responsibility to others. Just as
the sustainable design movement has built upon a popular desire to consider the effects
of our choices and resource use on the planet and on others (including future
generations), ethical rhetoric also considers how our rhetorical choices are ultimately
ethical decisions, always with motive, and always with consequences.
Summarizing James Kastely’s Rethinking the Rhetorical Tradition, Carolyn Miller
writes:
The positive task of rhetoric is not to persuade others away from injustice or to
promote remedies; it is to keep us constantly open to refutation, to the possibility
of seeing an alternative to the inadvertent wrong we commit. The inherency of
injustice is what makes rhetoric a philosophical problem, but refutation is what
rhetoric can offer to philosophy. (179)
A constant stance of openness toward refutation is key not only to Kastely’s work, but
also to ethical rhetoric as defined here. Perfection is not the goal; in fact, inadvertent
injury “is an inescapable aspect of a being who is born into a world that is shaped by a
language and by conventional practices that embody a particular set of values” (Kastely
42). Kenneth Burke reminded us all that, bound up in our terministic screens, people are
a necessarily mistaken species. Though the perfectly ethical encounter may be
impossible, I find hope in the space between the possible and the probable. I find
value—even necessity—in trying.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE RHETORICAL TRADITION

Rhetoric’s Ancient Beginnings
To begin the long road toward an(other) rhetoric, I will start with a review of
Plato/Socrates and Aristotle’s conceptions of rhetoric and ethics to understand how
these ancient thinkers have shaped our discipline and continue to influence rhetorical
thought today. For the Greek philosophers, ethics and virtue were closely tied to the
study of rhetoric. Raphael’s fresco The School of Athens famously depicts Plato and
Aristotle as the work’s central figures. Holding the Timaeus, Plato points to the heavens,
while his student, Aristotle, grips his Nicomachean Ethics and stretches his hand openpalmed down to the earth. Raphael alludes to one of the central distinctions between
the two philosophers: for Plato, virtue brings us closer to the divine, while Aristotle
insists that the object of ethics is “practical wisdom” with more earthly purposes (to
create good living).
Socrates, as portrayed through the dialogues of his student Plato, identified
knowledge with virtue. If knowledge can be learned, so can virtue. Thus, virtue can be
taught, and the quest for knowledge brings us closer to the divine, which is the ultimate
goal in Socratic ethical living. In the Phaedrus, knowledge is depicted as the
“recollection of the things our soul saw” when it was travelling with the gods on winged
horses, and the rhetorical art is then “a way of directing the soul by means of speech”
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(249c, 261a). In the Symposium, Diotima tells Socrates that “what we call studying
exists because knowledge is leaving us, because forgetting is the departure of
knowledge, while studying puts back a fresh memory in place of what went away,
thereby preserving a piece of knowledge” (208a). For Socrates, through philosophy,
Socratic discussion, and the questioning of all things—life and death, meaning, reality,
right and wrong—we reach a divine understanding of how to live our lives ethically or
“for the good,” to Socrates.
Plato later suggests that philosophy is “understanding knowledge and being
(reality) through the process of dialectic (one version of abstraction) and an
understanding of how the soul recollects knowledge” (Welch 39). In Republic VII, Plato
argues that education is not “putting knowledge into souls that lack it, like putting sight
into blind eyes” (518c). Rather, education takes for granted that the “sight” or “power to
learn” is already present in the soul, but education can “redirect” the soul appropriately
toward the good if students can allow reason to rule over the impure attractions of the
physical world (518 c-d). We are born with this “genuine knowledge” because our souls
existed prior to birth in the “higher realm,” or the realm of the Forms, which contain the
true nature of all things and are impossible for humans to fully grasp (Biffle 115-6).
Thus, truth is not transferred to man, but man is brought to the truth that already exists
in the soul through development of character and cultivation of morals.
Christopher Biffle explains that Platonic ethics “states that what we should do
with our lives is reject the attractions of the physical world, let our reason rule our
appetites, and pursue wisdom by purifying our souls with the study of philosophy” (116).
The purpose of ethics is ultimately an inward journey to find the proper balance of the
8

soul’s three functions—reason, appetite, and honor. Plato’s concern for others is
generally limited to promoting the ethical person’s responsibility to protect the well-being
of the community or state through living a just life and setting a good example.
Plato, most clearly in the Gorgias, puts rhetoric and ethics at odds with one
another. In the Gorgias, Socrates (Plato) claims that rhetoric is a knack (like pastry
baking and cosmetics) for “producing a certain gratification and pleasure,” not an art like
medicine or philosophy (462c). He argues that the aim of most rhetoric is flattery and
deception; it “guesses at what’s pleasant with no consideration for what’s best” (465a).
Virtue (the soul) is not inherent in rhetoric, and therefore without philosophy, rhetoric is
simply used for “instilling persuasion in the souls of an audience” and manipulating
others for personal gain (453a). Philosophy, on the other hand, is an art of truth
concerned with “the good,” and ethics belongs to this realm of truth. To Socrates,
rhetoric instills belief, but philosophy produces knowledge (the higher purpose). He
argues that rhetoric is merely the simulation of justice (as medicine stands to cookery),
but politics is the art of justice. Overall, Socrates’ unflattering review of rhetoric in the
Gorgias concludes that orators are not held in any regard at all, and that they have “the
least power of any in the city” (466b). Such accusations would lead to centuries of
skepticism and disdain against those who would align themselves with rhetoric and
praise its benefits, including the sophists.
In contrast to Plato/Socrates, Aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric is more concerned
with the practical uses of rhetoric in the world. In Aristotle’s view, to study rhetoric is to
learn how to persuade or to protect yourself against those who would use rhetoric
maliciously. Rhetoric is an art that is used to deceive; rhetoric “dresses itself up in the
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form of politics” (In Kennedy On Rhetoric, 1.2.1356a). In his central text, On Rhetoric,
Aristotle claims that rhetoric’s function is “not to persuade but to see the available
means of persuasion in each case” (1.2.1355b). Top students of rhetoric would
therefore be master speakers, trained to anticipate and disarm the rhetorical tactics of
their adversaries. Aristotle’s techniques have since been a central part of Western
education to train speakers and writers to effectively move and prepare to refute their
audiences.
Alternatively, students study ethics in order to improve their lives and pursue
happiness. In Rhetoric, Aristotle claims that there is one goal at which all people “aim in
what they choose to do and in what they avoid. Summarily stated, this is happiness and
its parts” (1.5.1). Happiness to Aristotle is a combination of virtue and success with
other internal and external “goods” like wealth, friendships, health, and beauty. Richard
Kraut writes:
Like Plato, [Aristotle] regards the ethical virtues (justice, courage, temperance
and so on) as complex rational, emotional and social skills. But he rejects Plato’s
idea that a training in the sciences and metaphysics is a necessary prerequisite
for a full understanding of our good. What we need, in order to live well, is a
proper appreciation of the way in which such goods as friendship, pleasure,
virtue, honor and wealth fit together as a whole. (“Aristotle’s Ethics”)
Students can acquire, through upbringing and education, the course of action best
suited to the situation based on reason. There are no general rules for this practical
wisdom. Students must acquire, through repetition, the skills to put a general
understanding of well-being into practice in ways that are suitable to each occasion
(Kraut, “Aristotle’s Ethics”). Though Aristotle echoes Plato’s privileging of reason and
concern for ordering the soul, Aristotle would make ethics an autonomous field
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independent of other branches of knowledge. In other words, the pursuit of ethics (the
good) does not require expertise in mathematics, science, or even rhetoric.
Aristotle’s best known work on ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics, set the baseline
for Aristotelian ethics that would continue to influence all thinking about ethics since.
Again, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle maintains that happiness (living well and
doing well) is “the highest of all goods achievable by action” (1.4). Though happiness
may seems like something “godlike and blessed,” he insists that happiness is not godsent (as Plato might argue) but “comes as a result of virtue and some process of
learning or training” (1.9). Happiness, he says, is “an activity of the soul in accordance
with perfect virtue” (1.13). Aristotle identifies two kinds of virtue—intellectual and moral.
Intellectual virtue comes from teaching and requires experience and time, while moral
virtue (ethike) is produced from habit (2.1). Good habits are required for good character,
and conversely good character arises from the continuous practice of good habits. To
Aristotle, both kinds of virtue are necessary for a human to achieve the highest good,
and thus virtue requires both practical and theoretical elements.
In Book VI, Aristotle compares wisdom (sophia) to practical wisdom (phronesis).
Wisdom is scientific knowledge and concerned with “higher things.” Practical wisdom is
neither scientific knowledge nor art, but is concerned with the individual, human things,
and human action and “making.” Aristotle values the contribution of practical wisdom as
the “action” and moral virtue as the “guide” to happiness. “The work of man is achieved
only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes
us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means,” says
Aristotle (6.12). Knowledge of rhetoric and the available means of persuasion is an art
11

(technē) that contributes (with wisdom, practical wisdom, knowledge, and intellect) to
happiness, but rhetoric is not in itself a study of ethics.
Through education and dialectic, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle sought a
(singular) path to the virtuous life for their students. Yet as Victor Vitanza suggests in
Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric, this required a particular type of
student and supported a sort of academic “imperialism.” Plato’s “theory of learning as
recollection” required that virtue and excellence already be “implanted into the individual
speaker in order to learn and speak well” (Vitanza 154). Aristotle’s theory of learning
based on having the right “predisposition” toward the virtuous “means (again) coming
from ‘the right families,’ or the elite” (Vitanza 154). Contemporary critics of the history of
rhetoric (Jarratt, Royster, Bizzell, and many others), as it has been canonized from our
ancient roots, have pointed to the exclusion of women and people of non-elite classes,
as well as the omission of sophistic rhetoric, as a serious ethical shortcoming of Platonic
and Aristotelian rhetoric.
Likewise, rhetoric as a discipline has been shaped by our Aristotelian inheritance,
from the long echoing link between rhetoric and persuasion to the “practical” instruction
for public speakers found in the techniques and tricks of the rhetorical trade offered in
On Rhetoric. George Kennedy remarks: “Most teachers of composition, communication,
and speech regard [On Rhetoric] as a seminal work that organizes its subject into
essential parts, provides insight into the nature of speech acts, creates categories and
terminology for discussing discourse, and illustrates and applies its teachings so that
they can be used in society” (x-xi). Aristotle’s rhetoric is thus used as a model for
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teaching effective public speaking; rhetoric is conceptualized as a utilitarian, ethically
neutral technē.
In the past 60 years, however, many contemporary scholars have helped to
expand rhetoric from strictly the realm of political discourse, citizen making, and the art
of persuasion for the world’s elite and have called into question not only the nature of
ethics, but also whose ethics we seek to teach. This shift has led to calls like Jim
Corder’s in “Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love” to speak a more “commodious”
language. A big, roomy language “full of space and time that will hold our diversities,”
and an abandonment of the self-endorsing “tribal talk” that shuts out others and breaks
down loving communication (31). “We have to see each other, to know each other, to be
present to each other, to embrace each other” (23). It has also opened the door for
feminist scholars such as Foss and Griffin (and later Jennifer Emerling Bone and T. M.
Linda Scholz) to appeal for a move beyond traditional conceptualizations of rhetoric as
persuasion to an invitational rhetoric that offers “a means to create ethical exchanges in
difficult situations” (Bone, et al. 435). Determining how we made this “turn” from
persuasion to invitation requires an examination of the rhetorical traditions that shaped
our discipline in the 20th Century.

The 20th Century Rhetorical Tradition
“The rhetorical tradition is always being edited,” says Patricia Bizzell (109).
Indeed, what counts as the “rhetorical tradition” depends largely on who you ask and
when you asked them. Maurice Charland likewise argues that pinning down a rhetorical
“tradition” when our history is neither coherent nor harmonious is particularly
13

problematic (120). In light of such arguments, I do not seek to imply that the field of
rhetoric and composition has followed a linear, well defined path over the last 100 years
to arrive at a point where rhetoric and composition departments universally agree on
concerns for ethics and rhetoric’s other. I concede that the notion of any one “20th
Century Rhetorical Tradition” is a slippery one, at best. However, I do suggest that
tracing some of the major movements that have influenced the study of rhetoric in the
20th Century helps us understand how disciplinary thought has progressively opened
toward ethical concerns, issues of rhetorical choices and consequences, concerns for
including traditionally “silenced” voices, and the relationship between rhetoric and
others. It also reveals that further study of the relationship between ethics and rhetoric is
a timely, appropriate pursuit for rhetoricians.
In their introduction to Twentieth–Century Rhetorics and Rhetoricians: Critical
Studies and Sources, Michael Moran and Michelle Ballif outline the critical movements
that have shaped the study (and subsequent “editing”) of rhetoric in the 20th Century.
While they also admit that the notion of 20th Century “rhetoric” still defies simple
definition, Moran and Ballif provide an overview of the many ways that rhetoric has been
conceived, theorized, and practiced over the last 100 years. As mentioned, this
historical background is critical to the current study of the 20th Century rhetorical
tradition and how the relationship between ethics and rhetoric relates to broader trends
in disciplinary thought.
Current-traditional rhetoric. Current-traditional rhetoric dominated the teaching
of rhetoric through the 1960s and was “committed to the positivism of nineteenthcentury science that assumed that reality existed apart from language used to express
14

it” (Moran and Ballif xiii). Therefore, language was only useful to the extent that it did not
distort reality. According to this tradition, good writing should function as a
“windowpane” through which the reader views the truth presented by the writer (Moran
and Ballif xiii). Current-traditionalists thus emphasized plain, unadorned style “that was
most closely identified with early science of the British Royal Society” (Moran and Ballif
xiii). Current-traditionalists assumed that writers already had ideas to communicate and
emphasized various strategies for organizing these ideas into essays by means of the
modes of discourse—usually some combination of description, narration, exposition,
and argumentation/persuasion.
Bizzell dubs the early to mid-20th Century the “traditional tradition” era in the
study of rhetoric, focused on the ancient texts written by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero,
Quintilian, Augustine, and so on. Choices in the rhetorical canon “were dominated by
the preferences of socially privileged men who saw Western culture as the best in the
world, and that culture itself as springing primarily from Greek and Roman roots,” writes
Bizzell (110). Summarizing Walter Ong, Bizzell describes education in the “traditional
tradition” as introduced via agonistic competition and requiring extensive education, first
in Latin and Greek (110). Later, publications such as Edward P.J. Corbett’s 1965 book,
Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, encouraged teachers to incorporate
elements of classical pedagogy into contemporary classrooms in a manner that could
not be more “traditionally traditional” (112). Bizzell claims that even into the mid-1980s,
the “traditional tradition” still dominated scholarship in the history of rhetoric to a
surprising degree, and the texts of the traditional tradition (such as Aristotle) still remain
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staples of rhetorical study (111). Indeed, current-traditional practices have not
altogether disappeared from the present-day teaching of rhetoric and composition.
Current-traditional rhetoric’s textbook-based methods of composition instruction,
focused on organization and final product, engendered a number of critiques about the
field’s limitations and ineffectiveness and triggered many subsequent countermovements. Criticism of current-traditional rhetoric included disapproval of the
tradition’s privileging of science and Western culture and inherent patriarchal,
aristocratic tendencies, as well as paradigmatic assumptions about the nature of
language, truth, reality, the writer, the audience, the instructor-student relationship, and
discourse. I argue that these counter-movements marked an evolving turn within the
discipline toward a concern for both personal and ethical matters in writing and rhetoric,
as well as increasing interest in the relationship between the writer/rhetor/self and
“others,” rather than his or her ability to make well organized, persuasive arguments.
Expressivism. The first challenge to current-traditional rhetoric came in the form
of expressive rhetoric. “Expressivism rejected the scientism of current-traditionalism
with its emphasis on correctness, clarity, and form and emphasized instead personal
writing that reflected the autonomous writer’s individual experience, reactions, and
beliefs” (Moran and Ballif xiv). For expressivists, meaning results from a private search
where the writer draws on both intellect and emotion to discover personally significant
truth (Moran and Ballif xiv). With expressivism, emphasis is on the writing process
rather than the final product, with discovery at the heart of the act of writing.
Expressivism depicts language as a tool of personal expression by stressing
freedom, discovery, and a search for the writer’s authentic self in the writing process.
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This new focus on the personal journey, rather than style and final product, served as a
first step toward considering larger ethical issues of the self’s relationship to others.
Cognitive rhetoric. Prevalent in the 1970s and early 1980s, cognitive rhetoric
extended the work of the expressivists by seeking to develop cognitive models of the
writing process based on the workings of the human mind as understood by cognitive
scientists (Moran and Ballif xvi). Although cognitive rhetoric has been criticized on a
number of grounds, as Andrea Lundsford notes, cognitive science has helped build
bridges “between disciplines in order to work toward a general theory of cognition and
communication” (Moran and Ballif xvi). Cognitivists theorize that thought exists in the
mind apart from language, and thus seek to discover how language/writing comes about
through the mind’s mental processes. Again stressing the self’s relationship to personal
expression, cognitivists focus on how the writer makes decisions mentally during the
writing process.
Like expressivism, cognitive rhetoric also emphasizes process over product. Both
expressivism and cognitive rhetoric directly refute the ethically neutral, five paragraph
essay-focused pedagogy of current-traditional rhetoric. Yet while focusing on the
generative process of rhetoric and composition, both movements fail to include any
significant discussion of the self’s relationship to others, the ethical dimensions of
language, and the consequences of our rhetorical choices in society.
Reclamation of the classical tradition/historiographies of rhetoric. The
reclamation of the classical tradition/historiographies of rhetoric emerged in the late
1930s and early 1940s with scholars like Kenneth Burke, who infused literary criticism
with neo-Aristotelian principles (Moran and Ballif xviii). “The reclamation of classical
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rhetoric served to join rhetoricians in English and speech communication departments,
to endow compositionists with a professional legitimacy unknown in American
institutions, and to attack current-traditional rhetoric’s theoretical and pedagogical
sterility” (Moran and Ballif xviii). This included the rediscovery and embrace of
Aristotelian principles such as invention. As will be discussed in detail shortly, Burke in
particular helped set the stage for transforming our Aristotelian inheritance in the study
of rhetoric.
New/social-epistemic rhetoric. The term new rhetoric (or social-epistemic
rhetoric) emerged in the 1980s, referring to any rhetorical practice other than currenttraditional rhetoric. According to Richard Ohmann, “modern rhetoric lowers the barrier
between speaker or writer and audience. It shifts emphasis toward cooperation,
mutuality, social harmony” (Moran and Ballif xx). Ohmann’s statement echoes the goals
of invitational rhetoric, a different rhetoric aimed at fostering camaraderie and mutuality
over confrontation and persuasion.
For Burke, the “key term for the ‘new’ rhetoric would be ‘identification’” rather
than persuasion, representing a significant reinterpretation of the discipline’s ancient
traditions (Moran and Ballif xx). Jacqueline Jones Royster contends that scholars such
as Burke and Foucault “have helped us to see more clearly over the last few decades
that we actually create and filter meaning from more elaborate perceptive possibilities,
making sense of what we see based on ideological frameworks and social practices”
(149). This “social turn” in the field of rhetoric—which emphasizes the ethical, social,
cultural, political, and ideological forces that influence the self within rhetorical discourse
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communities—not only expands the role of rhetoric well beyond persuasion, but also
serves as a crucial step toward a “rhetoric of ethics.”
For example, James Berlin calls the new rhetoric “social-epistemic” to stress that
while it does construct knowledge, it constructs social knowledge, which is situated
materially and historically (Moran and Ballif xxi). For social constructivists, writing is a
social act, emphasizing key terms such as “collaboration,” “consensus,” “community,”
and “conversation” (Moran and Ballif xxi). Social-epistemic rhetoric “questions the
transcendent self and views writers as subjects constructed through social processes
and according to ideological motivations” (Moran and Ballif xxviii). Therefore, rhetoric by
nature is both influenced by and capable of influencing the world, and consequently
rhetoric cannot be ethically neutral.
Another concern that has emerged in the new rhetoric is exploring ethical ways
of including the historically excluded. This attends to a rhetoric of ethics that
accommodates different, often “silenced,” voices. Critics of the history of rhetoric, as it
has been previously canonized, pointed to the exclusion of women and people of nonelite classes, as well as the omission of sophistic rhetoric. Royster writes that Western
rhetorics and their legacy in scholarship have been “demonstrably dominated by elite
male viewpoints and experiences” and that these traditions of theory and practice have
“tended to function with a heavy and relentlessly constraining hand” (149). Thus,
rhetoric as a discipline has been granted a distinctively Western, male, elite inheritance.
Yet the “new tradition” of rhetoric, as Bizzell calls it, “has been impacted by changes in
the demographics in the academy,” as well as changing cultural preferences (113). For
example, she notes that the induction of women and persons of color into the ranks of
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advanced rhetorical scholarship has helped shape the modern rhetorical canon.
“Scholars with some different cultural assumptions and interests than those of privileged
white men had to gain access to the textual record of human civilization, looking it over
for texts that could be adapted to these different scholars’ agendas,” argues Bizzell
(114). In many ways, new rhetoric struggled to give those previously ignored not only a
place in the Academy, but (channeling Spivak) a right to speak at all, again attending to
a distinctly ethical turn in the study and teaching of rhetoric.
Poststructuralism and postmodernism. Poststructuralists and postmodernists
challenge the definition of rhetoric as primarily communicative and persuasive in
purpose, and even the possibility of communication. Poststructuralist and postmodern
rhetorics view the writing subjects as “noncentered, as effects of language, of conflicting
and libidinally motivated discourses” (Moran and Ballif xxviii). Poststructuralism
(Barthes, de Man, Derrida, Lacan, Foucault) challenges the ability of language to
“represent” ideas, the very stability of those ideas, and the “self-present, sovereign,
knowing and speaking subject” (Moran and Ballif xxiii). Postmodernism saw a loss of
faith in the grand narratives passed down from the Enlightenment (Lyotard) such as “the
emancipation through total identity (of self and community) and through rational
thought” (Moran and Ballif xxiv). By challenging the nature of rhetoric, poststructuralists
and postmodernists “seriously problematize traditional notions of the rhetor, of the text,
of the rhetorical situation” (Moran and Ballif xxiv). Thus, whereas previous movements
challenged or redefined traditional notions of rhetoric, poststructuralism and
postmodernism effectively disrupts them.
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Arnett argues that, in asking us to stop leaning on universal assumptions,
postmodernity actually opens up rhetoric and dialogue to all walks of life. He says:
“Postmodern scholarship does not reject agency, but situates and embeds it in what
Martin Buber called the mud of everyday life; one cannot stand above history. The
ultimate element is what agency is embedded in—it is embedded in multiplicity of
ground” (“A Conversation” 58). Thus, the 20th Century metaphor of “knowledge” in
rhetorical ethics evolves into a contemporary metaphor of “learning,” which means that
“whatever I know must engage and risk being reshaped in a given moment” (“A
Conversation” 57). Postmodernism advances a rhetorical “turn” to ethics by asking the
question “What guides the self, other, or moment?” “What ground is the other standing
on—am I standing on?” Or as Burke might say, what “terministic screen” am I peering
through to understand and communicate with others?
Can we then reconsider, “What is rhetoric?” Is the ultimate goal of rhetoric
necessarily persuasion or the available means of persuasion? Do rhetorical statements
rely on written and spoken words, or can arguments be made by an image, a body
movement, or even by what is not said or what someone refuses to say? And in fact,
what exactly is a text?
Debra Hawhee’s “Rhetorics, Bodies, and Everyday Life” offers one postmodern
reexamination of what constitutes the rhetorical enterprise. She considers one
formulation of rhetoric put forward by Wayne Booth, who describes rhetoric as “the
entire range of resources that human beings share for producing effects on one
another,” effects which can be ethical, practical, emotional, and intellectual (158).
Booth’s definition opens the realm of rhetorical studies to new areas of consideration,
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especially visual rhetoric and the rhetoric of new media. “The discovery, use, and
effects of such ‘available means’ of rhetorical action transpires through bodies, spaces,
and the visual as much as it happens through the presumed twin-media of rhetoric—the
written and spoken word,” says Hawhee (163). For her, we can never escape rhetorical
situations, since we are constantly surrounded by them in everyday life—in an
advertisement, in an image, and even in the choice to smile or frown. Far from a tool
used by masterful rhetoricians for persuading and moving their audiences, rhetoric is a
part of everyone’s everyday interactions.
Importantly, as demonstrated, rhetoric’s relationship to ethics has also shifted
significantly over the past 60 years. This study seeks to build on the conception of
rhetoric as the ethical decisions made in the everyday interactions that constantly invite
us to make rhetorical choices, continuing with an examination of kairos/sophistic
rhetoric, identification, responsibility, listening and acknowledgement, and rhetoric as
love.
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CHAPTER THREE: A NEW RHETORICAL INHERITANCE

Sophistic Rhetoric and kairos
While some were rejected, other aspects of the ancient Greek rhetorical
traditions reappeared in the discipline as rhetorical scholars increasingly shifted their
focus to ethical concerns. For instance, the late 20th Century saw a “rereading” of the
sophists (maligned by Plato and Aristotle) by Susan Jarratt, Bruce McComiskey,
Michael Carter, James Kinneavy, and many others, as well as the reemergence of the
concept of kairos in rhetorical thought. McComiskey defines kairos as “seizing the
opportune moment, choosing arguments depending on the demands of the situation”
(111). In contrast to Aristotle’s persuasion, the early conceptions of kairos take on a
connotation of universal conflict resolution or diplomacy. Situating the encounter in its
appropriate kairos and using the “opportune moment” means opening the possibility to
ethical action based on shared consciousness.
In Dissoi Logoi, everything done at the right time is decent and everything done
at the wrong time is disgraceful (II 20). “Gorgias’s epistemology is relativistic,” writes
McComiskey, “and his corresponding rhetorical methodology works to seize the
opportune moment (kairos) in which certain kinds of language can be used to unite
subjective consciousness into a communal desire for action” (18). Building on the
principles of sophistry, McComiskey argues that recognizing kairos (not only possessing
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critical consciousness but understanding institutionalized strategies) gives us the
“discursive knowledge we need to compose our own timely rhetorical tactics, tactics
that, a little at a time, work toward challenging marginalizing strategies” (117). Thus not
only the strategy but also the goal of rhetoric changes radically from persuasion to
timely, communal action.
Unsurprising given its connection to socially situated kairos, sophistry has also
piqued the interest of social constructionists. For example, Michael Carter also supports
a rereading of sophistic rhetoric and ancient sophistic contributions to the discipline to
build on the contemporary work of the social constructionists. Recognizing that
discourse and knowledge are socially constituted, Carter examines the principles of
stasis and kairos to point toward a social constructionist foundation for classical rhetoric.
Although many contemporary social constructionists have looked for support for their
social theories outside of the discipline, he argues that they have overlooked this
important aspect of classical rhetoric coming from our own “rhetorical roots” (98).
Carter’s “Stasis and Kairos: Principles of Social Construction in Classical
Rhetoric” focuses on showing that the principles of stasis and kairos offer “a rich source
of understanding the social construction of discourse” (98). Stemming from the rhetoric
of Hermagoras, stasis is the means by which the rhetor identifies the “rhetorical issue,”
or the area of disagreement, through a set of questions leading the rhetor to topoi
appropriate to that issue. Carter distinguishes five identifying features of stasis: 1) stasis
grows out of the conflict of opposing forces, the initial accusation and denial; 2) this
stasiastic conflict is generative, creating an impetus for rhetorical action; 3) stasis is a
doctrine of inquiry, which involves asking questions; 4) stasis provides a means for
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solving the conflict, a direction for action; and 5) stasis is situational, it “provides a way
of defining the rhetorical situation, particularly the rhetorical conflict, so that the rhetors
can respond with arguments that are appropriate to that situation” (99-100). Key to
Carter’s social argument, then, is that stasis is not individualistic and internal, but
represents a community-oriented, socially-situated rhetoric (101). Notably, Carter’s
treatment of stasis is reminiscent of Corder’s discussion of ethos. His investigation
reveals a number of similarities between stasis and kairos relevant to our disciplinary
understanding of sophistic rhetoric: 1) both stasis and kairos feature the role of
opposing forces; 2) both act as a stimulus for rhetorical action; 3) both serve as guides
to resolving conflict through a judgment; 4) both offer systems of inquiry; and 5) both are
concerned with the rhetorical situation. Whereas Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
emphasized “scientistic” education and dialectic to lead their students to the virtuous
life, through stasis and kairos, the sophists taught their students timely, socially situated
rhetorical tactics to help resolve conflicts (reflecting a distinctly ethical concern).
In spite of its (mis)interpretation throughout history, kairos and sophistic rhetoric
had markedly ethical connotations, and these concepts have found numerous
advocates for their place in contemporary rhetoric/composition theory (e.g., James
Kinneavy). For the Pythagoreans, kairos was one of the “fundamental laws” of a
universe comprised of agonistic, opposing relationships. “The generative potential of
these opposing forces was achieved only through their harmony. And this was the
function of kairos,” writes Carter. Enos translated the term as “balance,” and later wrote
that “meaning is found through the synthesis of contradictory beliefs” (102). Carter
stresses that for Gorgias and the other sophists, the concept of kairos as “the opportune
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moment” also takes on an ethical dimension—a generative principle founded on conflict
and resolution (105). “It was not simply saying what the audience wanted to hear, as the
connotations of sophistry suggest, but it was facing squarely the tragic notion that all
logos is ‘deception’ and acting on the basis of what at the crucial time seemed to be the
truest logos” (106). A rhetoric based on kairos is thus fundamental to the sort of
“invitational” thinking required to attempt the ethical encounter.
Susan Jarratt also points to sophistic rhetoric as a long overlooked tradition in the
history of rhetoric. As she “rereads” the sophists in her attempt to refigure classical
rhetoric, Jarratt argues that sophistic teaching offers resources for bridging the gap
between individualism and community and for accommodating difference (88).
“Rewriting/rereading texts in terms of narrative logic of difference opens avenues not
only in literature but also in the history of rhetoric,” writes Jarratt. She argues that the
sophists teach us to not only situate a discourse in its kairos, but also to understand the
local nomos, or culturally negotiated norms that by necessity have an ethical dimension.
Jarratt seeks to accommodate difference through an understanding and use of kairos
and its associated nomos. As the following discussion will reveal, “accommodating
difference” is a central concern of rhetorical ethics.

Identification
Kenneth Burke was, in many ways, one of the first to reconsider rhetoric’s “uses”
from our ancient roots. Burke selects “rhetoric” (not philosophy, science, poetics, or any
of the other fields privileged by Plato and Aristotle) as his key term because it is the
“terministic screen” that most directly addresses how people understand each other and
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offers the greatest opportunity to come to terms with one another rather than to war
(Warnock 77). In Language as Symbolic Action, Burke characterizes what is essentially
the Socratic/Platonic/Aristotelian approach to the nature of language as “scientistic.” “A
‘scientistic’ approach begins with questions of naming, or definition,” says Burke (44).
He favors instead a “dramatistic” approach (essentially a sophistic approach) that
stresses “language as an aspect of ‘action,’ that is, ‘symbolic action’” (44). “Even if any
given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be
a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality,”
writes Burke (45). Reality could not exist for us if it were not profoundly involved in
symbol systems. For example, we may be immediately present in a room, but that room
is situated in a country, situated in a nation, situated in a web of international relations,
situated under cosmic relations, etc., which ultimately “dissolves into a web of ideas and
images that reach through our senses only insofar as the symbol systems that report on
them are heard or seen” (48). Behavior must be viewed through a kind of terministic
screen; since we cannot say anything without terms, whatever terms we use must
constitute a corresponding type of screen (49-50). Screens can be manipulative;
screens can be persuasive. “Insofar as man is the symbol-using animal, his world is
necessarily inspirited with the quality of the Symbol, the Word, the Logos, through which
he conceives it” (55). Burke’s concepts of symbol systems and terministic screens are
key to understanding the relationship between language and ideology. Later I will
extend Burke’s analysis to show how his conception of symbol systems, the relationship
between language and ideology, can be recast to foster an understanding of the
relationship between self and the other.
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One of Burke’s major contributions to the rhetorical tradition is his revision of
Aristotle’s persuasion with his notion of identification. According to Warnock,
identification is key to Burke because it represents the cooperation between reader and
writer that is essential to persuasion. “The distance between people, between their
individual bodies, motivates them to seek a ‘margin of overlap’ so that they can
communicate” (81). Within society, through symbolic action, the individual builds “his
symbolic bridges between his own unique combination [of experiences, situations, etc.]
and the social pattern” (83). Inherent in Burke’s goal of identification is his yearning for
the ethical encounter with others. In revising Aristotle’s persuasion with identification as
the key term for rhetoric, Burke chiefly aims to offer humankind rhetorical ways to better
communicate, build symbolic bridges with one another, and ultimately live in greater
harmony.
Burke began tying rhetoric to our ethical relationship with others through the
introduction of his “philosophy of rhetoric” in A Rhetoric of Motives, including concepts
like “identification” and “consubstantiality.” He writes, “In being identified with B, A is
‘substantially one’ with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he remains
unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a
distinct substance and consubstantial with one another” (21). Burke is careful to note
that the counterpart to identification is division, and even more so now that different
people and cultures have access to one another more readily. “Indeed, the very ‘global’
conditions which call for the greater identification of all men with one another have at
the same time increased the range of human conflict, the incentives to division,” warns
Burke (34). Faced with humankind’s enormous propensity toward division, Burke sees
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rhetoric as a means of tying us back together through identification to make
communication possible. Rhetoric is concerned with “the state of Babel after the Fall”
(23). For Burke, rhetoric dwells in the tension between identification and division.
Burke recognizes that the very act of identification carries with it division; there
are always ethical consequences to our rhetorical actions. Nevertheless, Burke does
ultimately support union as the fundamental goal of rhetoric. Burke writes, “Identification
is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no
need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one
substance, absolute communication would be of man’s very essence” (Rhetoric of
Motives 22). Rhetoric “leads us through the Scramble” in an attempt toward unity.
Warnock asserts that the primary aim of Burke’s rhetoric is to “combat attitudes and
actions that prevent people from ‘getting along’ with each other and to demonstrate how
people can fight verbally rather than physically” (77). To Burke, persuasion,
identification (consubstantiality), and communication are all ultimately tied together in
realistic functions that offer tangible possibilities for cooperation. Thus, there is a way to
make substantial connections with an “other” if we can speak the same language, per
se, or at least understand how and why that language is used for purpose of
identification (not just persuasion).
Burke also encourages humility and a sense of humor as important rhetorical
techniques—the “comic corrective”—in our relations with others. Burke says it best in
Attitudes Toward History:
The progress of humane enlightenment can go no further than in picturing people
not as vicious, but as mistaken. When you add that people are necessarily
mistaken, that all people are exposed to situations in which they must act as
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fools, that every insight contains its own special kind of blindness, you complete
the comic circle, returning again to the lesson of humility that underlies great
tragedy. (41)
By approaching rhetoric through this comic frame, we may view our opponent’s
mistakenness with compassion rather than rancor. He thus suggests that the choice
between opposition/confrontation and identification (cooperation, invitation) lies within
our own rhetorical choices and our own willingness to relate before retaliating. “Burke,
the comic optimist, puts the future of humanity in the hands of human beings
themselves and shows us that we have the power to invent and to construct the future
we desire,” says Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard (308). Burke desires that, by stripping
ourselves of our differences and building bridges through our terministic screens,
humans will have an opportunity to unite through our shared connections. An ethical
question posed to our discipline through reading Burke is then: Is this an appropriate (or
reasonable) goal of rhetoric?
Timothy Crusius argues that Burke sought to transform philosophy and rhetoric
as we know it, not to abandon it. To him, Burke’s “practical philosophy” sought selfunderstanding and went hand-in-hand with humanism (3). He writes:
Burke argues that we must treat one another as persons, as beings capable of
choice and action—not because we can prove such a claim beyond reasonable
doubt but because otherwise society and morality become impossible.
Dramatistic human being is implicit in language as addressed, as rhetoric, for we
do not bother to appeal to beings without the ability to respond, who lack
response-ability. (230-31)
Burke is realistic in his viewpoint on human nature, but ultimately optimistic regarding
our ability to think and act responsibly without falling into despair. Burke opens up the
possibility—naively, according to Sheard—that different cultures can find means for

30

“identifying” with one another in a way that neither are victimized by the encounter
(298). Burke’s “god-terms” serve as the grounds for identification between strangers,
whether the goal is assimilation into a local or global community (though their effects
can be a mixed blessing) (299). Yet, unity through assimilation has considerable
shortcomings, including loss of self, loss of freedom, and even annihilation.
One noteworthy example is the experience of non-native speakers of English in
writing courses or graduate students indoctrinated into a world of professional
publication. In both cases the individual can only gain access to one community by
loosening their ties with another (301). Sheard writes that “We live in a world in which
the differences between ourselves and others threaten to keep us apart, even to destroy
us. . . . Without identification, human progress is halted and human life threatened”
(307). Burke’s theory of discourse as symbolic action provides a way to consider
language as both the source of conflict and a way to overcome it (308).
Stephen Bygrave does not take Burke’s optimism as a sign of naiveté, as Sheard
does. “I take Burke’s optimism to be Gramsci’s ‘optimism of the will,’ the counterpart of
a ‘pessimism of the intellect,’ rather than a naïvely exclusive faith in daylight reason,”
says Bygrave (14). Burke’s is a rhetoric always directed at the “uses” of rhetoric, which
involves both context and effect together. Burke’s methodology of interpretation
privileges neither the author nor the audience. Bygrave argues that Burke also “refuses,
or suspends, the privilege other kinds of theoretical discourse afford themselves by
assuming their own distance or immunity from the critique they furnish of their objectdiscourse” (15). Throughout his work, Burke interrogates the procedures through which
discourse tries to legitimate or authorize itself (15). Burke’s rhetoric “offers a means of
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reading history as well as of reading into history: a means of connecting all sorts of
‘symbolic action’ to ideology and the programme of palpable action which underlies it”
(17). Bygrave would thus situate Burke’s rhetoric closer to Aristotle’s—a useful technē
to effectively arm and prepare actors to act in the world. But such a reading does not
fully reflect Burke’s ethical intentions.
I would argue that Burkean theory shares more common themes with the
sophists than with Plato and Aristotle. Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard classifies Burke
as a “contemporary sophist,” although she aligns him closer to Protagoras than to
Gorgias. In Burkean theory, she claims, kairos is the “scene” of rhetoric—kairos is
exigence and provides a method for deciding the course of action (292). Sheard
emphasizes the ethical nature of sophistic discourse practices over the more popular
association with opportunism and manipulation. Both Burke and the sophists believed
that rhetoric is metaphysical, rather than representational. Instead of merely reflecting
reality, language helps construct reality. Burke writes that “Man, qua man, is a symbol
user. In this respect every aspect of his ‘reality’ is likely to be seen through the fog of
symbols” (Rhetoric of Motives 136). In this way symbolic motives are inherent to
humankind. Burke reminds us that “whatever correspondence there is between a word
and the thing it names, the word is not the thing,” says Warnock (80). Though we do not
have direct access to the material world, we always engage it through our
consciousness, shared culture, language, ideas, preconceptions, identities, ideologies,
etc.
In defining Burke as a “neo-sophist,” Sheard summarizes Burke’s analysis of the
motives behind language as “fundamentally kairotic and his conception of the relations
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between rhetoric and reality [is] visionary—that is, directed toward future possibilities—
while still grounded in traditional, human values” (294). Like the sophists, Burke’s
“humanistic” philosophy is both optimistic (described by Rueckert as “a faith in the
creative, cooperative, and restorative powers of the word” and “a belief that a cure for
the disease of war can be found”) and realistic in his acceptance of humankind’s
predispositions and shortcomings (302). To create a better future, the sophists offered
resources for bridging the gap between individuals, resolving conflicts, and
accommodating difference. And that is largely why the sophists have reemerged as
central figures guiding our discipline’s renewed interest in rhetorical ethics.
As suggested in this analysis, an undeniable motive of Burke’s project is saving
civilization as we know it from the brink of nuclear destruction. The oft cited epigraph to
Burke’s 1945 A Grammar of Motives was, after all, ad bellum purificandum (toward the
purification of war). It is important to note that Burke did not see the possibility of war’s
elimination, but rather the “purification” of war’s potentially harmful nature by drawing it
into a less destructive channel. He considered war a “disease of cooperation,” and a
“perversion of communion” (A Rhetoric of Motives 20-22). He stressed that war is not
part of the essence of human relations but rather a perverted response to our
disagreements. Thus, the goal of rhetorical ethics in Burkean terms is not to eliminate
war or to debunk militaristic thought, but to find through identification “the moral
equivalent for war” (Attitudes Toward History 236).
So what does Burke bring to rhetorical ethics? A popular quote is attributed to
Buddha: “All beings tremble before violence. All fear death, all love life. See yourself in
others. Then whom can you hurt? What harm can you do?” In many ways, to me, this
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hopeful statement echoes the ultimate goal of Burke’s identification. Burke wanted our
discipline to recognize rhetoric, not for its ability to help us discover our godliness or
make us excellent speakers, but because understanding rhetoric leads us to understand
both the limitations of language and our own human limitations. In understanding our
shared limitations (we all tremble before violence, we all fear death) and in identifying
ourselves with others, Burke hoped we may find a means to a discourse of cooperation
rather than war. Put simply, Burke hoped. And there is value in Burke’s optimism that
humankind can find ways—rhetorical ways—to work toward a better future. As
Bonhoeffer says, though it may be wiser to be pessimistic as a means of avoiding
disappointment or ridicule, “the optimism that is will for the future should never be
despised,” for we all are responsible for reconstructing our present and for future
generations (Letters and Papers from Prison 15). Burke also undeniably transformed
rhetoric’s Aristotelian inheritance, setting a new paradigm for rhetoric’s relationship with
ethics. As I hope to reveal in the following discussion, other contemporary scholars of
the intersection between rhetoric and ethics have expanded Burke’s theories not only to
transform our discipline’s Platonic/Aristotelian inheritance, but also to appropriate a new
kairos for our Burkean inheritance.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RHETORICAL ETHICS

Responsibility
Burke had a lot to say about human nature: we are rational; we are inventors of
the negative (or moralized by the negative); we are separated from nature by
instruments of our own making (e.g., instruments of hunting, war, artificial light, etc.); we
favor order, hierarchy, status, etc.; and we are rotten with perfection (Language as
Symbolic Action 16). Most importantly, humans are also the world’s most sophisticated
critics. While emphasizing humankind’s unique ability to interpret signs and symbols,
Burke was also careful to warn that our greater critical capacity has “not only increased
the range of [our] solutions, but also the range of [our] problems” (Permanence and
Change 6). The danger lies in humankind’s propensity (even inclination) to misinterpret
signs. Writing between the World Wars, Burke bitterly denounced the “stupid national or
racial wars which have been fought precisely because these abstractions were
mistaken for realities” (Permanence and Change 6). Words become more than signs
when they are attached to events, objects, persons, institutions, classes—the name
given to things can determine how we respond to them.
Like Burke, Emmanuel Levinas and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, both born in 1906, were
deeply influenced by some of the most troubling events the world has witnessed during
World War II. Both were essentially contemporaries to Kenneth Burke, though
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Bonhoeffer’s career was tragically cut short by his execution at the hands of the Nazis in
1945. Burke and Levinas passed away just two years apart from each other, in 1993
and 1995 respectively.
As mentioned, Burke’s rhetoric of identification served realistic functions that
worked to offer tangible possibilities for cooperation with others. Through identification,
Burke largely supports unity as the fundamental goal of rhetoric. In contrast, Levinas
presents ethics as his first “first philosophy”—an ethics that is tied to the self’s
responsibility to the other and that privileges plurality and difference over Burke’s unity
and Plato’s ontology. “The responsibility for the other is the originary place of
identification,” says Levinas (Is it Righteous to Be 110). Responsibility, not identification,
is Levinas’ key term because identification can lead to “totalization,” the denial of the
other’s difference. Such totalization is an unethical act—a violence that Levinas claims
denies the autonomy/alterity of the other. In Ethics and Infinity, Levinas states bluntly
that his “critique of totality has come in fact after a political experience that we have not
yet forgotten” (78-9). Referring to the unforgettable lessons of World War II, Levinas’s
criticism of totality is born out of his disgust with the very real and very destructive antiSemitism and fear of difference that led to the Holocaust.
Levinas is also skeptical of the systems of dialectic and ontology passed down
from ancient Greece. To the Greek philosophers, claims Levinas, spirituality is
grounded primarily in “knowledge.” He argues that in Greek thought, the relationship
with the other “is a matter of grasping—in both senses of the term—a being: to
comprehend and to apprehend him, to unveil and to dominate him” (Is it Righteous to
Be 116). Absolute knowledge as promised by philosophy is a “thought of the Equal,”
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with an ultimate goal of “making the other become the Same” (Ethics and Infinity 91).
Levinas opposes this tradition passed down from the ancient philosophers because of
their ambition to name, and subsequently conquer/make same, the other. This
“grasping” stands in opposition to Levinas’s ethical encounter with the other, where the
Infinite evokes the Unequal. “In the access to the face there is certainly also an access
to the idea of God,” says Levinas (Ethics and Infinity 92). To Levinas, this access to the
idea of God, or infinity, means opening oneself to the unequal, “otherness” of the other.
In the “possibility of holiness” lies the need to “recognize the priority of an irreducible
alterity” in the other (Is it Righteous to Be 106).To Levinas, to truly love someone is to
approach him as “unique to the world” (Is it Righteous to Be 108).
Lisbeth Lipari writes in “Rhetoric’s Other: Levinas, Listening, and the Ethical
Response” that Levinas rejects the unity of being and instead stresses the infinite
alterity of the other (228). Levinas’s notion of the other, as widely used in this study,
refers to a person or thing that is alien, different, or not yet encountered (rather than
Levinas’ alternative sense of the “Other,” which references Otherwise than Being, or
God). “There is no other more authentically other than the unique,” says Levinas (Is it
Righteous to Be 112). However, he stresses that the other is not other because he has
different attributes, origin, race, etc. Instead, “the other is other because of me: unique
and in some manner different than the individual belonging to a genus” says Levinas. “It
is not difference which makes alterity: alterity makes difference,” where alterity refers to
the ability to distinguish between the self and the other-than-self (Is it Righteous to Be
106). The question of the other is anterior to the problem of ontology. Ethics arises in
the relation to the other in what cannot be knowable. To Lipari, Levinas emphasizes
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questions about relations with others over questions about being (228). “Levinas’s
philosophy does not ask the ontological question of whether to be or not to be but the
ethical question of whether my relation to others is justified. In short, to Levinas the
response to this question means ‘to fear injustice more than death, to prefer to suffer
than to commit injustice’” (228). And the fundamental exigency of justice, as Levinas
sees it, is “the love of the other man in his uniqueness” (Is it Righteous to Be 109).
Unlike for Burke, for Levinas unity would be an unjust, unethical aspiration.
Levinas theorizes that the ethical relationship comes from the asymmetrical
subordination of the self to the other, where the priority of the other always comes first
(Lipari 229). “Ceding one’s place to the other is paradigmatic of the kind of gesture that
Levinas terms ethical,” explains Jill Robbins in her introduction to Is it Righteous to Be?
(1). The self’s responsibility to the other is limitless and never ceasing. “Responsibility is
thus an incessant answerability for and response to the other,” says Robbins (3). This is
the attitude and demand of holiness to Levinas. Likewise, dialogue (rhetoric) and ethics
depend on one another, the two “converge in the whorl that is human being” (Lipari
229). Levinas’s rhetoric is invitational (rather than persuasive) in the constant concern
for and responsibility to the other.
To Levinas, the “face” is the expression of the demand of the other, and ethics
derives from the recognition of this face in all its otherness (230). In reading Levinas, I
am reminded of the phrase people use to greet each other in some Zulu areas of South
Africa: “Sawubona,” which means “I see you.” The response, “Ngikhona,” means “I am
here.” Says one blogger: “Inherent in the Zulu greeting and in the grateful response is
the sense that, until you saw me, I didn’t exist. By recognizing me, you brought me into
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existence. A Zulu folk saying clarifies this, ‘Umuntu ngumuntu nagabantu,’ meaning ‘A
person is a person because of other people.’” This description reflects a greater
assertion of Levinas’s ethics—that the ethical response begins with an encounter with
(or at least a glimpse of) the “face” of the other. The face, produced in encounter, is
naked, mortal, destitute, and defenseless. The face orders “thou shalt not kill,” the
paradigm for Levinas’s positive responsibility—the self must do everything in order that
the other live (Robbins 3). “The self is called to responsibility for the other before it is
free, and the face is the manifestation of the ethical exigency that is woven into the very
structure of human being,” says Lipari (229). Thus, Levinas imagines the ethical
response differently from both Plato/Aristotle and Burke. His ethics helped redefine our
disciplinary understanding of responsibility and concern for the other, where the object
is neither visions of the good (Plato/Aristotle) nor unity (Burke), but agency knit only in
responsibility. His writings have ignited countless conversations about “others” since.
Speaking about Levinas, Ronald Arnett says: “His understanding of agency is
derivative, not originative. He offers a responsive ‘I’ rather than the agency of an ‘I’ that
imposes willfulness upon the world. The notion of ‘call’ is fundamental to Levinas; his
ethics begins with a voice other than our own” (“A Conversation” 56). In this Levinasian
vein, I define an ethical encounter as an encounter that does not prioritize the needs or
will of the self over the other, but rather involves a sense of “thinking ecologically” about
our interactions with and responsibility to others. Like Burke, Levinas was not devoid of
his visions for peace, which he calls love. To him, peace is sociality and attending to the
other. “It means not to close one’s shutters, not to close one’s door, but to put a
mezuzah, a sign of welcome, on the doorpost” (Is it Righteous to Be 113). To support
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this goal of hospitality in a society placed “under the sign of shalom” means one must
always cede his place to the other (Is it Righteous to Be 113). One must recognize that
human beings are the only species in the animal kingdom willing to lay down their lives
for another. But one must also never overlook the unforgettable atrocities committed by
human beings for fear of difference.

Life Together
Unlike Levinas, Bonhoeffer did not survive the horrors of the Holocaust, but his
writings were also deeply influenced by a desire to reach out in more ethical,
responsible ways to others. There is little evidence that the rhetorical tradition—as it is
widely recognized and has been discussed here—overtly shaped Bonhoeffer’s writing,
and he never directly engaged the major texts belonging to the traditional rhetorical
canon. He was also a Lutheran pastor, theologian, unwavering defender of the faith,
and a bit of a “scandalous” thinker in Christian ethics for his time. It is unsurprising,
therefore, that Bonhoeffer is not widely talked about outside of theological circles. Yet, I
would suggest that much of Bonhoeffer’s work on ethics directly relates to the question
of the ethical encounter with others and is an appropriate area for further exploration in
rhetorical ethics.
Ned O’Gorman posits that Bonhoeffer’s work on discourse ethics, particularly on
truth telling, “entails a revelation of rhetoric, so often and infamously considered amoral
or immoral, as the ethical approach to communication” (Telling the Truth 225).
Bonhoeffer’s rhetoric is situational, social, and context-dependent and expresses a
richly ethical vision for communication with others (225). Like Aristotle, Bonhoeffer
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conceived his discourse ethics as an art that can be learned through experience,
practice, and principle (226). “Bonhoeffer thus presents us with an ethical vision rooted
in practical knowledge,” says O’Gorman (243). However, rhetoric is not limited to a
technē, and is far from ethically neutral. Bonhoeffer’s discourse ethics is “an articulation
of a social good . . . [that] is explicitly grounded in a social ontology” (244). Out of the
darkest times of the 1940s, he developed a rhetorical vision of ethical dialogue that
emerged from a social ontology “that included a basic theory of self, otherness, plurality,
order, and dignity, and a social crisis that threatened to crush these forms of being with
others” (O’Gorman 245). Bonhoeffer echoes the Greek philosophers, but presents a
new challenge to contemporary theorists, teachers, and practitioners of rhetoric who
would link rhetoric to larger issues of ethics and envision rhetoric’s possibility for
supporting a social good.
Bonhoeffer argues that we are all embedded agents, literally stuck in the mud
(ground) of our everyday life and framework. To Bonhoeffer, “The most immoral thing to
do to another is to destroy the ground of another person” (“A Conversation” 59). Ground
can emerge between persons—we can stand on our own ground and attend to another.
But, in Levinas’ language, we can only glimpse the face of the Other. “In the Old
Testament, we never see the face of God, only a glimpse. Dialogically, we never see or
grasp the face of the Other,” explains Arnett (“A Conversation” 59). In Bonhoeffer’s
ethics, “a glimpse, not a grasp, guides communication ethics that protects the ground of
another” (“A Conversation” 60). Bonhoeffer conceives an ethical encounter that
changes but ultimately preserves the ground of both the self and the other. He does not
shy away from difference; his goal is not assimilation. Like Levinas, Bonhoeffer does not
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demand unity, again supporting his reputation as a somewhat scandalous thinker to
many of his religious contemporaries.
Bonhoeffer is more hopeful than Levinas about the possibility of togetherness,
primarily because he is writing from a spiritual framework that answers the quandary of
Levinas’s asymmetrical relationship to the other through spiritual communion. In
Bonhoeffer’s ethics, this community precedes both the self’s identity and the relation
with the other (Marsh 666). “Bonhoeffer offers a view of the self emerging in the
originary I and extending beyond itself in social relation,” says Charles Marsh. “It is not
the other person that patterns this movement, but Christ . . . who extends the center of
the self from subjective constitution into life together” (667). The loss of self in
Bonhoeffer’s encounter does not necessarily mean the destruction of self, but rather the
re-centering and expanding of self. Levinas’s hospitality with the other is Bonhoeffer’s
Christ-like table-fellowship with strangers, caring for the sick, gathering with the weak
and suffering, and living out of responsibility for the neighbor. Levinas’s responsibility to
the other is Bonhoeffer’s “being there for the other” (Marsh 668). “Communications
ethics in action personifies Bonhoeffer’s rhetoric of responsibility,” says Arnett (Dialogic
Confession 1). In terms of rhetorical ethics, Bonhoeffer envisions an encounter with
others that engages with difference, maintains a stance of constant learning and teachability, greets the other in rhetoric and dialectic, and is tied to the other in Christ-like
responsibility.
Though not explicitly, Bonhoeffer indirectly appeals to kairos in his Ethics. He
emphasizes that the ethical as a theme is always tied to a definite time and a definite
place (260). He writes: “To confine the ethical phenomenon to its proper place and time
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is not to invalidate it; it is, on the contrary, to render it fully operative. Big guns are not
the right weapons for shooting sparrows” (261). Explains Arnett: “Levinas points to the
unity of theory and practice, and Bonhoeffer details the place of application in dialogic
response to the demands of the historical moment” (Dialogic Confession 4-5).
Bonhoeffer is aware that every situation must respond to the present moment, and
every response must be situated in its kairos.
Arnett describes the Bonhoeffer-inspired rhetoric classroom as one where neither
student nor teacher seeks to “unmask” the ground of each other. “Such a move invites
the danger of expecting another to engage a task with the same motives as my own.
Life simply needs to be bigger than such provincial impulses of attribution” (“A
Conversation” 60). He uses the example of an instructor who ridicules a conservative
Christian student’s faith life as “unsophisticated ideas” that should be eliminated. In the
imaginary Bonhoeffer classroom, rather than work to destroy another’s faith, the
instructor may employ a more “additive framework,” where both student and instructor
recognize that each are working from the bias of their own ground, and neither have all
the answers. Arnett reminds us that a glimpse, not a grasp, guides Bonhoeffer’s
rhetorical ethics that protects the ground of the other (“A Conversation” 60). Perhaps
such a classroom holds the potential of truly bringing disparate or excluded voices into
the same conversation. To that end, we now turn to an examination of how techniques
such as listening and acknowledgement have emerged as methods for enacting the
Levinas/Bonhoeffer model of rhetorical ethics.
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CHAPTER FIVE: METHODS FOR A NEW MODEL

Listening and Acknowledgement
If our ethical tie to the other is knotted up in responsibility (whether in the style of
Levinas, Bonhoeffer, or another), what rhetorical responses are appropriate for the
student of rhetoric? What rhetorical choices seek to accommodate rather than
assimilate difference? Studying persuasion and the available means of persuasion
would certainly fall short of preparing the rhetorician for such an ethical encounter.
Burke’s identification gave the field of rhetoric a foundation for exploring ways to build
bridges with others through understanding our shared language, symbol systems,
ideologies, etc. Building on Burke, Levinas, and others, new techniques have more
recently emerged in rhetorical theory to help attend to the quandary of ethical relations
with others.
For example, in “Rhetoric’s Other: Levinas, Listening, and the Ethical Response,”
Lipari argues that, historically, studies of rhetoric and dialogue have tended to pass over
listening in favor of speaking (and persuading), effectively banishing listening to the
subservient status of rhetoric’s other. However, to Lipari, listening actually makes the
ethical response to others possible (228). She draws on the philosophy of Levinas to
examine “the ethical exigency of the face and its relation to primordial discourse in order
to disclose the otherwise hidden significance of listening” and “make a case for
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conceptualizing listening as a form of co-constitutive communicative action that can
‘listen persons to speech’” (228). Rhetorical listening, I would argue, is a crucial
breakthrough in moving from a rhetoric of confrontation to invitation.
Lipari argues that quietly embedded in Levinas’s notion of responsibility to others
is the prior action of listening (229). Listening (or “listening otherwise”), essential to the
ethical encounter, can give birth to speech. “Listening is the invisible and inaudible
enactment of the ethical relation itself; on it, everything depends,” concludes Lipari
(242). An important note, on the one hand Levinas theorizes that “to make the stranger
a familiar is to do violence to the otherness of the other, to exclude some part of the
stranger” (237). Yet Lipari contends that “the listening, as opposed to the heard, does
not absorb the other into conformity with the self but instead creates a dwelling space to
receive the alterity of the other, and let it resonate” (237). Lipari does offer hope for a
non-violent encounter with others through listening that does not demand the hopes of
unity central to Burke’s identification. “The (in)vocation of dialogic ethics is a giving birth
to speech by listening, it is a dwelling place from where we offer our hospitality to the
other and the world,” says Lipari, echoing Levinas (240). Listening not only makes
space for others’ differences in encounter, but also invites different (perhaps even
“quieter”) voices into the conversation. Lipari privileges listening and dwelling together
over persuasion and confrontation.
Like Lipari, Ratcliffe calls for a revival of listening as a focus of study in rhetoric
and composition. She defines rhetorical listening as a “trope for interpretive invention” or
“code of cross-cultural conduct” that produces a “stance of openness” that can be
assumed in cross-cultural relations (1). She argues that the concept of rhetorical
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listening supplements Burke’s rhetorical theory, particularly his identification theory.
Focusing on identifications with gender and whiteness in Rhetorical Listening:
Identification, Gender, Whiteness, Ratcliffe examines how people can employ modes of
rhetorical listening to “foster conscious identifications . . . in ways that may, in turn,
facilitate cross-cultural communication about any topic” (2). This includes negotiating
troubled identifications. She fully recognizes the many challenges of cross-cultural
communication, including the importance of recognizing privilege to combat oppression.
She quotes Wildman and Davis: “Only in visualizing [privilege] and incorporating it into
discourse can people of good faith combat discrimination” in ways that prevent their
doing “more harm than good” (7). The journey to communicating with others starts with
a long, sobering look at yourself. “We have to listen to other people, not so that they will
do the work for us but, as Morrison reminds us in Beloved, so that we and they may lay
our stories alongside one another’s,” says Ratcliffe (8). The idea is reinforced by
Childers and hooks: “People really learn from the sharing of experience” (8). In all,
Ratcliffe amplifies Burke’s identification with her appeal to rhetorical listening.
She also notes that listening—hearing and recognizing differences—echoes
Levinas’s call for the self’s continuous ethical engagement with others (151). Listening
to each others’ stories helps us engage in dialogue with our own experiences and
observations. Listening should therefore be both theorized and taught in rhetoric and
composition. To this end, Ratcliffe offers listening metonymically to public debates,
eavesdropping in scholarly discourses, and listening pedagogically to classroom
resistance as specific “tactics” of rhetorical listening.
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While Lipari and Ratcliffe stress rhetorical listening, for Michael Hyde, positive
acknowledgement is essential to our ethical relations with others. In The Life-Giving Gift
of Acknowledgement, he writes that “the act of acknowledgement is a communicative
behavior that grants attention to others and thereby makes room for them in our lives”
(1). This acknowledgement requires a sustained openness to others (4).
“Acknowledgement is a conscious act of creation that marks an origin, a beginning, an
opening in space-time where people can feel at home as they dwell, deliberate, and
know together,” says Hyde (10). The notion of hospitality or “feeling at home” again
echoes Levinas, just as his appeal to togetherness invokes Bonhoeffer. Through the act
of acknowledgement, Hyde ties rhetoric and ethics to our everyday responsibilities and
interactions with others. Like Lipari and Ratcliffe, Hyde does not demand the goal of
unity central to Burke’s identification. Instead, he supports positive acknowledgement as
a means of opening to and embracing the infinite alterity of others. Together, Lipari,
Ratcliffe, and Hyde help contribute two important techniques—rhetorical listening and
positive acknowledgement—that support the goals of rhetorical ethics and invitational
rhetoric.

Rhetoric as Love
Jim Corder is another supporter of reviving listening and acknowledgement as
appropriate rhetorical techniques. As mentioned, in “Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric
as Love,” Corder calls for us to speak a more “commodious” language with one another.
Writing in the mid-1980s, Corder turns the “traditional tradition” of education in rhetoric
on its head by suggesting that the goal of rhetoric is not primarily to persuade others,
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but actually to prepare ourselves to deal with the “genuinely contending narratives” that
ask us to reexamine our own, deeply held narratives. In this way, Corder draws ethical
concerns into the realm of rhetoric.
Corder states bluntly that the “risk in argument” is greater than we have learned
from our Aristotelian inheritance and from others like psychologist Carl Rogers, whose
humanistic approach to communication revised the traditional Aristotelian framework for
rhetoric and widely influenced college writing curriculum beginning in the early 1970s
(25). While the insights of Aristotelian and Rogerian argument have been useful for
teaching students to pattern arguments in ways that may in fact be persuasive, Corder
emphasizes that these traditional modes of rhetoric do not prepare students to face the
“flushed, feverish, quaky, shaky, angry, scared, hurt, shocked, disappointed, alarmed,
outraged, even terrified condition that a person comes to when his or her narrative is
opposed by a genuinely contending narrative” (21). As I would put it, they do not
prepare us for the challenges of invitational rhetoric, or for an ethical encounter in a truly
difficult situation.
Corder echoes Bonhoeffer’s description of the “ground” of our everyday life and
framework in his repeated assertions that we are always “standing some place” in our
lives, always “standing somewhere in our narratives when we speak to others or to
ourselves” (16-17). He also channels Burke when he posits that humans are “always
agents for what can be known” and “inventing the narratives that are our lives” (17).
Truth is not only stranger than fiction; it is our fiction, created through language, history,
experience, etc. Burke’s symbol systems and “god-terms” are “the ground” to
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Bonhoeffer and “tribal talk” to Corder—we speak what we have lived and indentify
through what we share.
Just like this study, Corder is interested in what happens during encounter—in
his vocabulary, what happens when one narrative encounters another, different
narrative. Specifically, he is concerned with what happens during a type of contention,
which he calls “steadfast arguments,” during which both narrators (self and other) are
“wholly intent upon preserving the nature and movement of his or her narrative, earnest
and zealous to keep its identity” (23). Corder asks the key question of ethical relations:
What happens when there really is no hope of agreement? Corder is optimistic that an
ethical approach to rhetoric—where rhetoric is love—can encourage us to not only
speak a commodious language, but also hear a commodious language in our everyday
encounters (32). Corder resonates with Burke’s attempts toward unity through
identification (and with the other studies of listening to and acknowledging others),
although his goal is more mutual understanding and tolerance than total unification.
Corder’s self does not lose its own identity, but learns to listen to and uphold others’
own narratives.
Levinas’s face-to-face encounter with the other does not contain the possibility
for mutual understanding and “embrace” that Corder demands. Levinas’ relationship
with the other is inherently non-symmetrical and one of subjection; our tie with the other
is “knotted only as responsibility” (Ethics and Infinity 97). Integral to Corder’s call for
rhetoric as love is emergence toward the other as an equal. He is clear in his
description of the ethical encounter (or at least the encounter we should all strive for):
we have to see, know, be present to, and embrace each other (23). Like Levinas, he
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also advocates maintaining a sense of almost reverent responsibility to others to
support mutual understanding.
Corder’s rhetoric requires changing the way we talk about and conceive
arguments (25). Again, Corder directly refutes traditional methods of teaching rhetorical
argument as solidly laid out paths of display and presentation, proposition, evidence,
and conclusion (e.g., Rogers, Young, Becker, Pike, Hairston, etc.). Instead, he calls for
more “arguments full of the anecdotal, personal, and cultural reflections that will make
us plain to all others, thoughtful histories and narratives that reveal us as we’re reaching
for the others” (31). He calls us to abandon authoritative positions and puffery in
argument. Argument should not be a display or presentation, or “my poster against
yours, with the prize to the slickest performance” (26). Argument is instead “emergence
toward the other” (26). Rhetoric is love.
Corder does concede that “some conflicts will not be resolved in time and love,”
but suggests that “most failures of communication result from some willful or inadvertent
but unloving violation of the space and time we and others live in” (27, 31). One could
also question how the historically silenced can gain a voice if they are to give up
authority in a world that will never be devoid of arrogance, opportunism, and ignorance.
In other words, his argument in some ways assumes that the arguer already possesses
a privileged position that he or she can agree to abandon. Nevertheless, Corder raised
the interest of a discipline when he asked us to learn to love before we disagree (26).
And he candidly admits that this often means that the arguer must go it alone, with no
guarantee that the other or any audience will be “kindly disposed” toward him or her
(28). He writes:
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The arguer, alone, must see in the reverence owed to the other, discover and
offer all grace that he or she can muster, and, most especially, extend every
liberty possible to the other. The arguer must hold the other wholly in mind and
yet cherish his or her own identity. Then, perhaps, the arguer and the other may
be able to break into mutuality. (28)
He does not expect this to be an easy (or fast) endeavor, but holds it as a necessary
goal. Corder also finds hope in the space between the possible and the probable, and
his call is to continue learning and trying to incorporate ethical concerns into the study
and practice of rhetoric. In seeking mutuality over persuasion or unity, we practice
rhetoric as love.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

An(other) Rhetoric: Moving Forward
As I reach this conclusion, I find an irony inherent in this study of rhetorical
ethics. Here I am asked to draw conclusions, to make my argument. In the minuscule
slice of dialogue in the vast universe of our disciplinary discussion that this thesis
represents, I must assert my own personal authority and contribute to the “ongoing
debate.” I have read, studied, and changed as a result, but my personal journey falls
short of disciplinary goals. I must now say others are wrong and I am right. In this I hear
Lipari’s lament that that we have passed over listening in favor of speaking and
persuading; we have banished listening to the subservient status of rhetoric’s other.
Through the very act of writing this paper, I find something lacking in the disciplinary
tradition that “others” me. To be a master of rhetoric, it seems I have lost my ability to
say, “I don’t know the answer, but I am listening... infinitely listening.”
For surely the disciplinary debate regarding what represents an ethical encounter
with “others” continues, and may always go on. For example, we continue to debate the
ethical ways of including the historically excluded within our discipline and canon, as
well as the potential for such inclusion and representation. Focusing on issues of
feminism and representation, Amy Hinterberger argues that feminist researchers
occupy a place of power and authority which by nature requires a commitment to
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ethically represent “others.” Specifically, in her article on “Feminism and the Politics of
Representation,” she addresses feminist concerns of speaking “for others” and
obstacles of representing across differences of race, sexuality, gender, and culture.
Feminists, she claims, “cannot transparently know who ‘oppressed people’ are and what
will aid them simply because they are concerned with the politics of empowerment” (7576). This highlights Spivak’s concern regarding how intellectuals construct the wills of
“oppressed people” (76). Hinterberger also considers how hierarchies of oppression and
privileged ontological positions are inconsistently represented in feminist discussions,
suggesting that differences between “others” are being represented in potentially
problematic ways. For instance, through references to binaries such as
“liberation/oppression” or “western/non-western,” feminist theorists can end up
reproducing the same polarizing categories they seek to escape (81). In spite of these
challenges and additional ones, we should not abandon the task of working towards an
ethical involvement with “others.”
In fact, I would “argue” that the focus on rhetorical ethics could not be timelier.
This study began with the assertion that our discipline’s focus has shifted from
confrontational rhetoric to invitational rhetoric (as defined by Foss, Griffin, Bone, and
Scholz) over the past 60 years. It is important to note that I do not suggest that
persuasion is always an inappropriate rhetorical tactic. Every situation must respond to
the present moment; every response must be situated in its kairos. However, a strict
definition of rhetoric as persuasion denies an important connection between ethics and
rhetoric that must be explored further, just as a sole disciplinary focus on persuasion is
problematic because of those it threatens to exclude. I have suggested that one
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possible definition of the ethical encounter is an encounter that does not prioritize the
needs or will of the self over the other, but rather involves a sense of “thinking
ecologically” about our interactions with others—recognizing that our rhetorical choices
are ultimately ethical decisions, always with motive, and always with consequences in
the world.
I believe the preceding study of the 20th Century rhetorical tradition and specific
analysis of identification, responsibility, listening and acknowledgement, rhetoric as
love, and kairos supports such a reading of ethical encounters and leads us to several
possible conclusions about the nature of rhetorical ethics. The ethical engagement with
others as shaped by the rhetorical theories discussed involves, among many things:


Understanding the role of language and symbol systems in human interaction.



Embracing humility and a sense of humor in rhetorical situations.



Seeking a “face-to-face” encounter with others.



Creating a “dwelling space” for difference in ethical encounters.



Protecting the “ground” of both the self and the other when we communicate.



Listening, acknowledging, and offering time for reflection to encourage the most
ethical response possible.



Abandoning authoritative positions and puffery, and instead envisioning rhetoric as
love.



Considering that every self/other, and thus every encounter, is different. In the end,
we need kairos.

Such goals support a more invitational rhetoric that attends to ethical concerns by
seeking to understand rather than convert, support camaraderie and mutuality (if not
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unity) instead of reinforcing dominant power relationships, challenge the speaker as
much as the audience, and privilege listening and invitation over persuasion when
appropriate.
Arnett speaks about the notion of satyagraha, the dialogic nonviolent change
supported by Mahatma Gandhi, versus duragraha, or stubborn persistence (“A
Conversation” 53). I would argue that both are effective strategies. Persuasion,
violence, and “bully tactics” used to have one’s way without concern for the other (which
can be literally for the other’s life, but also for the other’s difference) have and continue
to be effective rhetorical strategies. Likewise, in situations of extreme violation of basic
human rights, such as genocide, action based on satyagraha may be inappropriate. As
Martin Buber retorted to Gandhi, nonviolence against the Nazis would have been
impossible. Again, kairos is key. But effectiveness is not the only factor in the choice of
rhetorical strategy. Instead, rhetoric is the practice of everyday existence; its concern is
how we dwell with others in the world. We therefore cannot ignore the wider ethical
concerns of rhetoric.
Though their theoretical frameworks vary, Burke, Levinas, Bonhoeffer, and the
others studied here all envision a paradigm where ethical concerns do guide our
rhetorical choices with others. Significant areas of continued study regarding rhetorical
ethics include issues of voice, agency, and marginalization. Invitational rhetoric cannot
guarantee that quieter or disadvantaged voices will be heard unless all participants
embrace the invitation. In all, an(other) rhetoric is both a ripe topic for continued
disciplinary attention, as well as a necessary component of everyday interactions with
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others that long to display love over hate, listening over silencing, inclusion over
exclusion, and acceptance over rejection.
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